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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. FRED FLEMING, ~ 
_ vs.Plaintiff and Respondent, 
FLEMING FELT COMPANY, 
a corporation, and ~ 
JOSEPH H. FELT and 
MARIE FELT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8732 
Reply Brief of Defendants 
and Appellants 
STATEMENrr OF FACTS 
Appellants made a statement of facts in their intial 
brief, therefore no further statement as such is appro-
priate here. However, errors and misleading inferPli<'<'S 
with respect to the facts as stated by Respondent will he 
discussed in the argument which follows: 
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POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
THE CONTRACT OF AUGUST 31, 1953, IS 
NOT ONE-SIDED, INEQUITABLE OR UN-
ENFORCEABLE. 
POIXT XO. II 
THE COXTRACT OF AUGUST 31, 1953, WAS 
NOT INDUCED BY FRAUD. 
POIXT XO. III 
THERE WAS XO BREACH OF THE CON-
TRACT OF A"GGrST 31, 1953, JUSTIFYING 
ITS RESCISSIOX. 
POIXT XO. IV 
RESCISSIOX OF THE COXTRACT IS 
BARRED BY LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND 
"\VAIYER. 
POIXT XO. Y. 
THE COrRT ERRED IX GRAXTING A 
~fOXEY .JrDG:JIEXT ~-\.XD IX .ASSESSING 
IXTEHEST. 
~\RGr:JfEXT 
POIXT XO. I 
THE COXTH.:\CT OF ~\rGT'BT 31, 1953, IS 
NOT O~E-SIDED, IXEQFITABLE OR UN-
ENF<) H.( ~EABLE. 
Ht·~pondl'llt attempts to attack the contract by point-
ing ou1 1 hn 1 although Fleming was to be general manager, 
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he was controlled by the Felts through the Board of Di-
rectors. Respondent then refers to circumstances by 
which it is claimed that Fleming's rights as general man-
ager were violated. Respondent's argument is without 
merit, for even if it were to be assumed that Respondent's 
rights as general manager were interfered with, it docs 
not follow that the contract was inequitable, one-sided 
or illegal. The showing of a breach of contract does not 
justify any finding that the contract itself is illegal. The 
circumstances complained of by Fleming at most could 
give rise to a claim for damages for breach or possibly for 
injunctive or declaratory relief. Rescission of the con-
tract, however, is not warranted. 
The contract is set forth in full in Appellants' initial 
brief (pp. 6-11). On pages 12 and 13 of his brief, Re-
spondent dwells upon the supposed harsh and inequitable 
provisions of the contract as to him. He would even have 
the court believe, as stated on the bottom of page 12, 
that in the event of default in payment of the Felt stock, 
the contract would cause him to forfeit and lose his stock 
in the corporation. Such conclusion is entirely unwar-
ranted under paragraph 8 of the contract. 
Regardless of the claim of Respondent that the con-
tract is onerous as to him, he cannot deny that hy its 
terms he was granted the following: 
1. 1:3,;)12 shares of stock in the new corporation 
were issued to him. 
2. He was granted an option to pnr('hase the Felt 
stock in the corporation for an agre<•d price. 
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3. He was granted the right to be general mana-
ger of the corporation, subject to the limita-
tions of paragraph 4 of the contract. 
4. He was granted the right to have immediate 
possession of the Felt stock in the corporation, 
with a provision in connection with said stock 
which precluded the Felts from negotiating, 
assigning, transferring or pledging their stock. 
5. He was granted the right to pay for the Felt 
stock at any time, subject to a provision that 
no more than 30 per cent of the price could be 
paid in any one year. 
Substantial rights having been granted to Respondent by 
the contract, there is no justification under the authorities 
cited by Appellants in their intial brief for the trial court 
to grant a rescission on the ground that the contract was 
one-sided, inequitable or unenforceable. 
POIXT XO. II 
THE COXTR~\CT OF ~\FGrST 31, 1953, WAS 
XOT IXDrCED BY FRArD. 
The record shows that the claim of fraud was inci-
dental. The memorandum decision failed to mention 
fraud. The conclusions of law and judgment are silent as 
to fraud. Though in paragraph S thereof, the court made 
;1 finding- n~ to fraud, such finding is not sustained by the 
('\·idt>JH't>. This is point l'd out in .Appellants· initial brief 
at pn g-Ps 1 :> 1 o :?(). 
J~(·~pondl'llt Sl)ts forth on page 5 of his brief the al-
lflg-Pd misrl'pn)sl'ntntions. Tl1e sum total of the evidence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-in the record with respect thereto is quoted on pages 16 
and 18 of Appellants' initial brief. Respondent has the 
burden of showing that the Felts misrepresented the state 
of their mind. This the Respondent failed to do. There 
is no direct evidence whatsoever of misrepresentation. 
Commencing on page 15 of his brief, the Respondent 
claims that an action for fraud may be predicated on a 
promise accompanied by a present intention not to per-
form. With this rule we agree, if certain other requisites 
are met. However, an elaborate statement of the rule does 
not substitute for the proof required to show a deceitful 
state of mind. 
Commencing on page 18 of his brief, the Respondent 
attempts to set forth a method of proving intent not to 
perform. The general statement from 51 A.L.R. 164 that 
'' ... subsequent conduct and speech on the part of the 
promissor may be resorted to for the purpose of show-
ing fraudulent intent ... " only begs the question: "What 
subsequent conduct and speech may be resorted to?'' 
The Respondent is certainly not helped by the fol-
lowing excerpt from the quoted portion of 51 A.L.R. 164, 
which language implies facts completely different from 
those of the instant case: 
"Where the time which elapses between 1lw 
making of the promise and the refusal to perform 
it is inconsequential, and there is no change in cir-
cumstances, or the promissor does not make even 
a pretense of performance .... " 
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Of much more significance is the language of the 
annotator in 51 A.L.R. 166, wherein the annotator dis-
cusses the quality of proof required: 
'' ... but the facts which show the intention 
not to perform the promises must be clear and un-
questioned, and the courts of chancery will indulge 
in no presumptions or surmises of fraud. The pre-
sumption is that a person making a representation 
as to what he expects or hopes is about to take 
place, in order to induce action on the part of the 
person to whom it is made, acts honestly, however 
extravagant such hopes might be .... '' 
The terse excerpt from Cll icago T. & N. C. R. Co. Y. 
Titterington, 19 S.W. 472 (Texas) suggests that when 
there is '' ... not even a ... pretense of complying with 
the contract ... '' a jury could find that the promissor had 
no intention to perform, but even Fleming has never 
made the exaggerated claim that the Felts never made 
eYen so much as a pretense to perform the contract. 
The record shows that the Felts tried for a period of 
nearly two years to perform the contract. If any repre-
sentation or promise was not fulfilled, there is a much 
more obvious explanation for the failure to fulfill the 
same than that of a deceitful state of mind at the outset. 
Obviously the authorities cited on this point by the 
Respondent are not in point. They do not apply to the 
facts of this case. 
The facts show that the Felts intended to retire. ~Ir. 
Felt was an ('ldPrly man, too ill to testify at the trial, and 
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he is now deceased (R. 287-A). However, the Felts wanted 
to han' assurance that Respondent could successfully 
operate the business and that he could be able to complete 
the purchase of their stock. The Respondent failed to 
give them this assurance. Fleming had the contractual 
assurance of the position of general manager, subject to 
the limitation sof paragraph 4 of the contract. If his 
duties as such were interferred with as he claims, this 
interference is no basis for an inference of a deceitful 
state of mind on the part of the Felts. 
Nothing can be claimed for the alleged representa-
tion that the business could be purchased for $17,000.00 
or $18,000.00. This occurred before the inventory ·was 
taken. After the inventory was taken and the price deter-
mined, the figure of $33,267.00 was set up in the contract 
and agreed upon by all the parties before signing. There 
is nothing here to show a deceitful mind. 
The claim of obsolescence in the Felt inventory is to-
tally without merit and has been discussed in the initial 
brief of the Appellants (pp. 25-26). 
On page 21 of his brief, Respondent would have the 
court infer that the representation as to retirement was 
false, because the contract contains no provision for 
retirement. The more obvious inference would be that 
the matter of retirement was inconsquential. If it was so 
important, one wonders why Fleming did not insist on a 
provision therefor in the contract. He had ample oppor-
tunity, as several drafts of the contract were ma<le in an 
effort to satisfy him. The record, however, is silent as to 
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his ever-making a request for such a provision. The mat-
ter of retirement is obviously an after-thought with 
Fleming, as the record is devoid of any request or inquiry 
by Fleming during 22 months of operation as to when 
the Felts were going to retire. 
Xo inference of fraud can be drawn from the fact that 
~Ir. Felt was president of the corporation. He had been 
president since the corporation was organized (R. 59, 
123). Again Fleming had ample opportunity to raise his 
voice in opposition thereto. The position of president was 
not deviously sought after or secured by ::\Ir. Felt. Flem-
ing, in any event, was protected in his rights as general 
manager by the contract itself. 
10:. 
~:: 
Any alleged statement by Mr. Felt in April, 1955, ._., i 
after some 19 months of operation, that the contract was 
not acceptable, is susceptible to no inference of fraud. 
Counsel for Fleming states on page 21 of his brief 
that as soon as Fleming tried to assert his office as gen-
eral manager, he was opposed by the Felts. This state-
ment is not true. Fleming, on cross-examination, admitted 
that he acted as general manager even before the con-
tract was entered into, and the unrefuted testimony of 
l\Irs. Felt was that he never complained of interference 
with his management until January~ 1955, nearly 17 
months after the contract was signed- not until a finan-
eial statement was submitted to him evidencing that the 
husiness waH not being operated profitably (R. :218, 219). 
Although Fleming, on his direct examination, claims to 
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after the contract was signed, and indicates that he was 
opposed by the Felts (R. 67-69}, the uncontradicted testi-
mony of Mrs. Felt was that there had never been any 
complaint made to the Felts prior to January, 1955 
(R. 220). In other words, any opposition to any of the 
suggested changes by Felt did not bring forth any com-
plaint on his part until January, 1955. 
The statements made by counsel for the Respondent 
on pages 17, 18, etc. of his brief, to the effect that the Felts 
and Fleming were on unequal footing and that there 
existed a confidential relationship in entering into the 
contract is totally incorrect. Fleming was not a juvenile 
totally lacking in experience. As a matter of fact, he had 
been in the business of selling automotive equipment as 
the" A. Fred Fleming Company" since 1949 (R. 57) and 
no doubt had all the business experience normally inci-
dent thereto. The merger with the Felts did not involve 
an experience in an unfamiliar field. He had, before deal-
ing with the Felts, and even while acting as general man-
ager of the Fleming-Felt Company, entered into private 
contractual relationships for the sale of automobile parts 
and supplies (R. 82-84). He insisted on several revisions 
of the contract (R. 105). He studied each of them (R. 
105). He admitted he knew what he was signing (R. 105). 
It is obvious he knew what was in and what was not ill 
the contract. 
The claim of the Respondent on page 18 of his Brief 
that there existed at the time of entering into the contract 
a confidential relationship is novel, to say the least. The 
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broad statement taken from 37 C.J.S. Section 35, page 
283 is certainly of no help to him, for the only case cited 
as authority for the suggestion that the rules applicable 
to situations involving a confidential relationship might 
apply to ''persons jointly entering into a business enter-
prise" is Teachout v. Va;nHoesen, 40 X.\Y. 96 (Iowa1888). 
However, in that case the plaintiff had been the defend-
ant's confidential business advisor, and had enjoined 
secrecy in the proposed operation. 
Generally, before a confidential relationship will be ~~.: 
found to exist between two persons, it must appear that Rn 
one has gained the confidence of the other and purports 
to act or ad-vise with the other's interest in mind. While J:~: 
there might have existed such a relationship after the 
agreement ·was signed, when Fleming and Felt were deal- I:P 
ing with third parties or as persons jointly interested in 
the welfare of the company, surely in reaching an agree-
ment at the outset governing their respective interests, 
rights and duties, each was obliged and would be expected 
to look out for his own int~rests. See Restatement of the 
Law of Trusts, Sec. ~(d). Thorne Y. Reiser, 60 X.W. (2d) ll.l 
IR.t, 7RR (Iowa 1953); In Re Jlcflonne77's Estate, 119 
P(2d) :2:~8. :2-!1 (..:\riz. 19-!7); Tri7son Y. Rentie 254 P. 64, 
66 (Okla. 1926). 
The i1lfen'nres of a deceitful state of mind, which 
Ht>~pmldt'nt would like to draw from the actions of the 
A ppt'llant~, are unwarranted. Rather, it would appear 
that Respondent was incapable of managing the business h, 
HlH'<'<'HHfnll~,, and therefore entered upon a. course which 
10 
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was calculated to cast upon Appellants the blame for Re-
spondent's failure and deficiences. 
POINT NO. III 
THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE CON-
TRACT OF AUGUST 31, 1953, JUSTIFYING 
ITS RESCISSION. 
The trial court found in findings of fact numbers 7 
and 11 (R. 272, Appellant's initial brief 37) that Respond-
ent had wrongfully been deprived of his duties as general 
manager. No mention is made of this in the memorandum 
decision, conclusions of law or judgment of the trial court. 
A discussion of these findings was included in Appellants' 
initial Brief under Point 4, to avoid any possibility that 
such findings might be considered by this court as a basis 
for rescission. 
One or two issues raised by the Respondent should 
be commented upon. Counsel for the Respondent makes a 
point of the fact that Mrs. Felt was re-hired after being 
fired by Fleming. After being shown that the company 
was losing money, Fleming was determined to assert him-
self and justify his conduct. This was a good time to get 
rid of the Felts, and so he proceeded to fire both. Why 
wait for retirement~ Fleming claims to have been able 
to hire a competent bookkeeper at $200.00 per month, but 
this is not the whole picture. Mrs. Felt was not only serv-
ing as a bookkeeper in the office, but was the secretary and 
treasurer of the company, and Exhibit 15-D, page 9, 
shows that Mrs. Felt was not re-hired by the corporation 
11 
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as a mere bookkeeper, but that she was voted a salary as 
the secretary and treasurer of the company. (Exhibit 
15-D, p. 9; R. 74, 75.) 
Counsel refers to a so-called Board of Directors' 
meeting in January, 1955, "when Fleming was reduced to 
a sales manager.'' The meeting referred to was obviously 
not a Board of Directors' meeting, and was not an official 
act of the company in the slightest degree, nor did Flem-
ing himself, or either of the Felts thereafter, pay any 
attention to it. The corporate minutes do not include 
this meeting (Exhibit 15-D, R. 241, 242). The matter was 
dropped and Fleming continued to act as general man-
ager (R. 242). 
Furthermore, Fleming, who now complains that his 
prerogatives as general manager of the company were 
taken away, never, for some 19 months, held any kind of 
a meeting with the Felts or met with the inside force (R. 
221, 222). Never did he hold a meeting of the company 
with those in the office, as is customarily done in success-
ful businesses (R. 222). 
Paragraph 4 of the contract provides, among other 
things, that Fleming shall be general manager "so long 
as Fleming arts in good faith for the benefit of the cor-
poration" (Appellants initial Brief, p. 8). At the time of 
the resolution in 1\[a~~, 1!155, complained of by Fleming, 
strained relations lwtween the parties had existed for 
SP\'ernl months. Fleming had flared up at the dinner 
meeting in Janna r~', 1955, when he ·was challenged with 
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(R. 70, 220). Rather than approach the matter objec-
tively, Fleming, in a spiteful manner, posted a notice in 
the office of the company in full view of the public, in 
which the duties of general manager were listed (R. 216-
217). This could have only the effect of advising the pub-
lic of internal dissension in the corporation, and surely 
could not be considered to be '' in good faith for the bene-
fit of the corporation," particularly in view of the fact 
that all the employees had previously been notified of 
the contents of the notice (R. 216). Also, it will be re-
called that Fleming fired Mr. Felt in March, 1955, and 
fired Marie Felt in April, 1955. The record fails to show 
that this was done in the interest of the corporation. It 
appears rather to have been accomplished to satisfy the 
ego and caprice of Respondent. 
Thus: ( 1) after Fleming had functioned as general 
manager for some nineteen months, (2) after it appeared 
that the corporation was losing money, (3) after it ap-
peared that the manager was not interested in objectively 
approaching the problems of management but instead had 
launched upon a course of action calculated to jeopardize 
the interest of the corporatoin and the future security of 
the Felts, and ( 4) after Fleming had secretly withdrawn 
all the funds of the corporation and deposited them to his 
personal account (R. 72, 73, 121, 122, 223, 224), the de-
fendants were justified in taking an action that would 
eliminate the source of the difficulty. Under such condi-
tions we submit the action of the Board of Directors of 
May 23, 1955, in passing the By-Laws (Exhibit 2-P; R. 
265) complained of by Respondent was proper. In any 
13 
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event, this action at this late date could not warrant a 
rescission of the contract. 
POINT NO. IV 
RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT IS 
BARRED BY LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND 
WAIVER. 
Respondent contends, on page 32, that the defenses of 
estoppel and waiver are unavailable to Appellants be-
cause they were not pleaded. While the word ''estoppel'' 
is not used in the pleadings, we invite this court's atten-
tion to the facts pleaded in paragraph 15 of Defendants' 
answer to Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (R. 20). 
'' 15. If the plaintiff relied on any representa-
tions of defendants or any of them, the plaintiff is 
barred by his own laches from praying for a 
rescission of the contract, and for damages for 
breach thereof, in this: that plaintiff's agent par-
ticipated in taking the inventory alleged by plain-
tiff to contain obsolete material, and plaintiff, who 
acted as general manager of the defendant corpo-
ration from August 31, 1953, until June 8, 1955, 
had access at all times to the stock in trade of the 
defendant corporation, and to the inventory of the 
said stock in trade and the prices of each individ-
ual item, which inYentory was on plaintiff's desk 
for long periods of time; that the said inventory 
was nYaila hle to plaintiff prior to plaintiff's sign-
ing the contract and thereafter; that since August 
31, 1953, until June 8, 1955, the combined inventory 
of the said stock in trade of the plaintiff and de-
fendant company has materially changed, and be-
cause of the mismanagement h~~ the plaintiff of the 
defendant company the balance of the assets and 
14 
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liabilities of the defendant company is less than 
it was prior to the addition of the inventory ()f 
plaintiff.'' 
It is recognized that waiver and estoppel are affirma-
tive defenses. However, Appellants contend that whether 
they were pleaded or not, they are now issues before this 
court undr Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which reads in part as follows: 
''When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by expreess or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues.'' 
The evidence relied upon by Appellants in this con-
nection was admitted without objection. This being true, 
Respondent is deemed to have consented to the introduc-
tion of the issues of waiver, estoppel and laches in this 
case. Under this rule, Appellants contend that these 
issues are now before this court without amendment. 
The said portion of Rule 15 (b) is identical to Fed-
eral Rule 15 (b) under which it is clear that the issues of 
waiver and estoppel are before this court. 
Commenting on Rule 15(b), Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, Vol. 3, page 846, states : 
"While an amendment to conform to evidence may 
be made at any time on motion of any party, even 
15 
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in the appellate court, the lack of an amendment 
does not affect the judgment in any way. In effect, 
therefore, the parties may, by express consent, or 
by the introduction of evidence without objection, 
amend the pleadings at will.'' 
Supporting authorities are cited, among which is 
Gulf Smokeless Coal Co. v. Sutton, Steele & Steele, 35 F. 
( 2d) 433 ( CCA 4th, 1929), wherein the court held that the 
plaintiff could amend in the appellate court to conform to 
proof, or the appellate court could consider the amend-
ment as made. See also Globe Liquor Co. v. San Romwn, 
160 F. (2d) 800, (CCA, 7th, 1947); Continental Illinois 
National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago Y. Ehrhart, 127 F. 
(2d) 341, (CCA 6th, 1942). 
In the case of Fifth Avenue Ba;n.k of New York v. 
Hammond Realty Co., 130 F (2d) 993, (CCA 7th, 1942), 
certiorari denied, 63 S. Ct. 666, 318 U. S. 765, 87 L. Ed. 
1136, it was held that on appeal the pleadings would be 
deemed amended to meet the proof. The court, in AetM 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Rhine, 152 F. (2d) 368, (CCA 5th 1945), 
held that on appeal, evidence rather than pleading would 
be regarded. Likewise it was held in Katz Drug Co. v. 
Katz, 89 F. Supp. 528, (D.C. l\Io. 1950), that the issue of 
laches, though not pleaded, would be treated as if prop-
erly raised where evidence in the record clearly estab-
lished such a defense. 
It is claimed on page 24 of Respondent's brief, that 
laches and t·~toppcl require more than mere delay. And 
more thcrr was! Of course, the Felts were prejudiced by 
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intermixed. Rescission would become increasingly more 
difficult. Furthermore, if there were grounds for rescis-
sion, Fleming, under the judgment as granted, was con-
tinually benefiting from his failure to take any action. 
Money was constantly being paid out for his salary, pur-
suant to the terms of the contract, and not in accordance 
with what might have been a reasonable value for his 
services. Shares of stock belonging to the Felts were tied 
up and in his possession. 
As already pointed out in Point No. III of the appel-
lant's initial Brief, Fleming was affirming the contract 
right up until June, 1955 - nearly 22 months after the 
commencement of operations. Under the Utah cases cited 
by the appellants, Fleming is precluded from seeking a 
rescission. Fleming continued to benefit from the con-
tract, for he held onto the Felts' shares of stock, retained 
his option to purchase the shares and continued to re-
ceive his salary of $400.00 per month. There is no evi-
dence to show that he performed services for which he 
was entitled to receive $400.00 per month absent the con-
tract. In other words, the salary he received was pay-
ment pursuant to the contract, a benefit received under 
the contract and cannot be considered a quantum meruit 
return for services performed. While it might be argued 
that Fleming might be entitled to reasonable compensa-
tion for his services, and that the receipt of such would 
not be a legal benefit, the fact remains that Fleming 
received $400.00 per month pursuant to the contract. 
There is nothing to show that his services warranted such 
compensation. On the contrary, the financial statement, 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit 12-P (R. 265), indicates that his services were 
worth but little. 
Counsel for the Respondent blandly claims that the 
Felts were not injured. However, in March, 1955, Flem-
ing fired Mr. Felt and put him right out of the business 
(R. 74, 223). This one act alone conclusively shows that 
in spite of Fleming's claims to the contrary, he asserted 
his prerogatives as manager. What better evidence of 
his authority and power to assert the same could be 
asked~ This was an unambiguous affirmance of the con-
tract. It was not nullified in the least. Mr. Felt never 
came back into the business, and certainly this was an 
obvious detriment to the Felts. "Felt, however, decided 
to go . . . '' says the respondent on p. 7 of his Brief. 
We are confident the court will not be impressed with I ,; 
Respondent's futile attempt to gloss over this glar-
ing episode. 
Fleming, by waiting nearly two years to seek a rescis-
sion of the contract, while the inventories were being co-
mingled and intermixed, by continuing to draw his salary, 
by firing Mr. Felt and putting him out of the business, 
created a situation which clearly estopped him from seek-
ing a rescission of the contract. 
18 
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POINT NO. V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
MONEY JUDGMENT AND IN ASSESSING 
INTEREST. 
Respondent says, on page 37 of his Brief, that "it 
was evident to the court that defendants could not restore 
what plaintiff contributed in specie and it was imprac-
ticable to decree a restoration of the property." Such a 
statement is contrary to the evidence (R. 132, 133, Appel-
lant's initial Brief, 45-47). If rescission is proper, the 
court should allow a return of property in kind insofar as 
this is possible. This is possible in two ways: (1) the 
return of that part of Fleming's original goods not sold, 
and ( 2) the return of merchandise on hand identical to 
stock furnished by Fleming and sold. 
On page 39 of his Brief, Respondent cites Kimball v. 
Salt Lake City, 32 Ut. 253, 90 P. 395 at page 261, and 
Fell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 
1003, in support of his claim for interest. Neither of the 
cases is in point. The Kimball case was an action for 
damages for changing the grade in the street in front of 
plaintiff's property. The Fell case was also for damages 
for injury to livestock in transit. Neither was an equi-
table action. Neither involved facts even remotely re-
sembling the instant case. The case at bar is one for 
rescission involving equitable principles. 
Respondent had the use and benefit of this property, 
the value of which the trial court has assessed interest 
upon in the operation of the business until the time he left. 
19 
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In addition, he had income from it during all the period 
in which the court assessed interest. Under circumstances 
as existed in this case, equity will not award him interest 
in addition. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has failed to justify affirmance of the 
judgment of the trial court. Appellants maintain that 
there is no basis for a rescission of the contract as set 
forth in the first three points herein. However, if rescis-
sion is otherwise proper, the remedy is not available to 
Respondent by reason of laches, waiver and estoppel, 
and finally, if for any reason the court considers rescis-
sion a proper remedy, then true equitable principles 
should be applied in restoring the parties to their original 
position. Interest should be eliminated, and Appellants 
should be allowed to return property in kind to Respond-
ent. Fleming, who never put so much as one dime of cash 
into the business, should never be allowed by a court 
of equity to get $16,000.00 cash out of it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, !fcMILLAN & 
RICHARDS and HAROLD R. BOYER 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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